An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 16

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 16:

Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, Bergman focuses all his attention on overshadowing the Iranian nation’s extraordinary achievement in the past half a century. An unrivalled unity and sacrifice that shattered the Pahlavi dictatorship and put an end to the US, British and particularly Zionist dominance on Iran further brought this nation to the fore. Shortly after this historic event, exemplary resistance to an invader backed by world powers now driven out of Iran, Arab regional leaders and even the Soviet Union further boosted Iran’s standing in the eyes of nations dominated by the West and turned Iran into an attractive model. Since the consequences of such an act are totally clear to the author and associated intelligence services, he has sought to sully Imam Khomeini’s image and wrongfully describe the mobilization of Iranians for pushing back Saddam’s aggression.

To that end, several facts are falsified: first, ignoring US, British and Israeli efforts to trigger a coup before the war and focusing only on Saddam. For instance, the 1980 coup is described as follows: “At first, Saddam had worked at trying to undermine the stability of the new regime from the inside. He initiated a broad plan to “liberate” part of Khuzestan, a city in western Iran, and to install a new Iranian government there under the patronage of the exiled Shah. The attempted rebellion was set for July 10, 1980, but the plan was discovered by Khomeini’s intelligence and crushed with great brutality…After several such attempts, Saddam gave up on the idea of subversion and decided to take a more direct path.” (Chapter 3, p. 52)

Evidence available in this field is too clear to need any further explanation in disproving Bergman. Only nations could be central to a widespread military coup and play a decisive role that had worked with Iranian Army generals, Imperial Guard officers or senior Savak officials and that there was mutual trust between them. Such security organs like the CIA, MI6 and Mossad had precise information about assessment of effective manpower in Iran. Of course, given Saddam’s willingness to become the regional gendarme, he was only hired as a link between the coup plotters. A group of Savak agents and Army generals, led by Palizban, had been deployed at the Iraqi border with Iran. Turkey had also let another group led by Aryana to be stationed at the border with Iran to join a possible coup. Sha’ban Ja’fari, a confidant of the Zionists, was central to the 1953 coup. He recounts his role as follows: “I was in the US when I received a message from the late [Gen. Bahram] Aryana, asking me to fly to Turkey. I went there and we worked together for some time…Lt. Gen. [Hamid] Amiri was there. Col. Amirnour, who died here, and several other Imperial Guard officers were also there. They were then going here and there. They came and they were housed. Around noon, food was distributed between them. Gen. [Abdi] Minoo Sepehr was there. With Gashtasb, Ayrana’s son, he seized Iran-owned Tabarzin vessel, which gave rise to big hue and cry. They killed a number of revolutionary guardsmen in Rezaieh…Aryana gave me two letters to deliver to Yitzhak Rabin and Ghuzi Nargess. He also gave me a letter to be delivered to Rad. You must know him. His residence is like the White House.” (Shaban Jafari’s memories, interview with Homa Sarshar, Abi Publications, 2002, p. 354)

To shed further light on what nations could lead the coup in Iran, we review the longstanding relationship between the Zionists and Sha’ban Jafari, nicknamed Sha’ban the brainless, from the viewpoint of Israel’s ambassador about how many hooligans were released from prison throughout the coup to help coup plotters reach their objective. “The friends of Hero Ja’fari released this pro-Shah, patriotist and brave figure from prison. Sha’ban Ja’fari had visited Israel several times and he was a close friend of Israelis.” (Festschrift, Meir Ezri, 2000, Jerusalem, vol. 2, p. 28)

Therefore, before Saddam’s invasion of Iran, the Zionists were central to subversive plots against the Islamic Republic, as attested in the documents gathered at the US embassy in Tehran. For instance, a document shows exchanges between Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi – the foreign minister of the interim government – and the top US diplomat based in Tehran. Yadi offers evidence about US-Israeli attempts to launch separatist movements. But the American diplomat keeps mum.

“The talks were mainly focused on Iraq and Kurdistan. Yazdi was almost assured that both the US and Israel were backing Iraq in its assistance of rebels. We could disprove it, but the facts Yazdi highlighted showed public criticism of the Bazargan government…For the rest of discussions, Yazdi looked angrier and sadder than before…The main issue was Kurdistan. Yazdi said he had intelligence showing Kurdish rebels received much support from overseas and he described the Kurdistan issue as being very serious. Yazdi said the interim government had received intelligence showing the US and Israel, in cooperation with Iraq, were aiding Kurdish rebels.” (The Other Side of Accusations, Abbas Amir Entezam’s memories, vol. 2, pp. 200-201) [citing October 17, 1979, Cite Tehran 54502 documents, October 18, 1979 letter from US chargé d’affaires in Iran to US State Department]

Therefore, as everyone within the wide political spectrum of those days notes, the Zionists were a main element of separatist and other subversive acts following the victory of the Islamic Revolution. How can Bergman expect his audience to accept the allegation that following the failure of these machinations and engagement of the enemies of the Islamic Revolution in direct confrontation, the Zionists would change position and stand by Iranians? “The Iraqi columns advanced almost without meeting any opposition, conquering city after city and oil field after oil field. The way seemed clear for Iraq to occupy all of Iran, and the Khomeini regime was hanging by a hair. But Saddam Hussein had not taken into account the devotion and fanaticism of the followers of the imam—nor the potential for Israel to intervene clandestinely on the side of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (Chapter 3, p. 52)

The allegation that Saddam could occupy Iran, i.e. overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the Zionists stopped it is not solid-based and goes in conflict with every evidence, even Western sources. As it was explained in the previous chapter, Saddam proposed ceasefire one week after invading Iran. Did it mean that Saddam could conquer the entire Iran and Tehran’s rejection of ceasefire meant being in the position of weakness? Reviewing some battlefield reports from Zionist sources unveils many realities. Radio Cologne reported on the 8th day following Saddam’s invasion of Iran: “The Iraqi Army Staff thought that Iraqi military units could bring Iran to its knees in a blitzkrieg like the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, but Iraqis failed to make any headway except in some small parts of the border strip…in response to Saddam’s proposed ceasefire, Iranian leaders have said as long as Iraq has not called its troops back from Iran, they would not accept any proposal for talks or mediation.” (Pars Agency, September 30, 1980)

Radio London also referred to the unity of Iranian people and its influential resistance on the battlefield, saying: “If six days ago, Saddam thought that he had found a good opportunity to humiliate Iran and can strengthen its position in Iraq and become the powerful man in the Arab world, he should think twice now. By invading Iran, Iraq was seeking to discredit the Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime, but it seems that such objective has failed and it has even united Iranians.” (Pars Agency, September 28, 1980)

We briefly review Western media reports on the battlefield between defenders of Iran and Iraqi invading forces:

Radio Israel quoted political sources in Baghdad as saying: “The Iraqi government is surprised by Iranian counterattacks. It is willing to end the war with Iran because the war has continued for more than Iraq thought.” (Pars Agency, September 27, 1980)

In order to precisely understand Iraq’s approach towards Iraq-Iran War, we review a report from Israeli state radio on the 6th day of the invasion.

“General Aryana, the former head of Iran’s Army, has released a statement proclaiming himself Commander of the Iran Liberation Army, calling on soldiers to destroy the Iranian regime.” (Radio Israel, September 27, 1980)

It is no secret to anyone that the Shah’s Army generals, all directly connected to Tel Aviv, had made arrangements with Saddam before his invasion of Iran. In fact, the idea was to launch sabotage attacks from all directions in order to guarantee Saddam’s success.

The Times of London reported: “Several pro-Shah generals currently living in the West have set up a committee in London to make necessary arrangements for a military coup in Iran. The committee is led by General Aryana, the former chief of staff of Iran’s Army.” (Pars Agency, September 27, 1980)

Stern, printed in Germany, also reported about attempts by the remnants of the Shah Army and Savak around Iran as Saddam launched his invasion of the country. “45,000 pro-Shah servicemen in the military camps outside Iran (along Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan borders) as well as 25,000 troops in the Persian Gulf littoral states like Bahrain and Oman and nearly 3,000 servicemen in Egypt are in full combat readiness. They are all waiting for Washington’s signal because they depend on US technology and facilities to start [an invasion].” (Pars Agency, September 27, 1980)

In light of such widely-known attempt by the Zionist-led forces, how can one rely on Bergman in his claim of support for the Islamic Republic to repel Saddam’s invasion? The answer is clear. The objective is to discredit the unrivalled and brilliant resistance of the Iranian nation throughout history because if this aspect is not portrayed wrongly, more and more nations will adopt the Iranian model.