An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 17

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 17:

Fortunately, those who intend to forge history make very big errors that would be scoffed at by even unaware persons. For instance, Bergman writes in this chapter: “Saddam Hussein’s invasion was only ten months old. The war would last for eight years, and cost over a million lives, but at the time it seemed likely that Saddam’s superior forces would soon be parading through Tehran… Among the problems the Iranian forces had no answer for were minefields that had been laid by the Iraqis between the front lines of the two armies.” (Chapter 3, p. 53)

Bergman seems to be unfamiliar with the most basic rules of war. On the one hand, he claims that in the 10th month following Saddam’s invasion of Iran, the Iraqi army would be soon parading in Tehran, while on the other, he acknowledges that one of the major challenges for Iranians was the landmines laid by the Baathist forces along the frontline between the two armies. If in the 10th month of Saddam’s invasion of Iran, Iraqi forces were on the offensive why should they have laid mines around themselves? Creating such barriers is aimed at preventing offensives. It means that the Baathist forces had laid mines and booby traps and drilled canals for fear of Iranian assaults. It implies that Iraqis had been intimidated as they had to protect the border strip they had occupied by surprise attacks at the beginning of the war. Despite all obstacles created by the Iraqis, Iranian defense forces were pushing them back. Now, can Bergman explain how Baathist forces who were advancing towards Tehran had created fortresses around themselves to keep Iranian forces aloof? The truth is that after Saddam’s invasion of Iran, it took several days for Iran to arrange its defense capacity. Contrary to Bergman’s allegations, only a few number of the Shah’s Army generals were executed due to their role in the massacre of Iranians and a large number were retired or dismissed due to drug addiction and moral issues. Furthermore, the necessity of changing structures and neutralizing the negative atmosphere created by West-leaning Leftist grouplets calling for the dissolution of the Army was not possible overnight as young new commanders had to take over in the Army. The enemies of Iran’s national independence, who gained nothing from the propaganda over the dissolution of the Army, pinned hope on the void left following reshuffle in the Army and organized a widespread invasion of Iran. But what pinned down the invader was the trust of the entire nation in the leadership of the Revolution and the necessity of defending the territorial integrity of the country. However, Bergman downgrades the national unity built over the Imam and prevailing religious and national zeal to “devotion and fanaticism of Khomeini’s followers”.

I was in Ahvaz during the first week of the Iraqi invasion of Iran. I witnessed large numbers of people flowing into war zones. Tribesmen, armed with WWI-era vz. 24 rifle, were ready for any sacrifice. These forces who had come to the battlefield with devotion had been organized in “irregular” forces. They launched night raids on Baathist forces, seized Iraqi tanks and laid mines on the roads. That is how the equations changed, forcing the invading forces to shift from offensive to defensive in the second week and set up minefields around themselves to repel surprise raids. By that time, it was no question of supplying equipment and components as we neither had time nor felt any need to do so. We were mainly seeking to identify depots of outdated weapons to empower volunteer forces to upgrade their nightly maneuvering power. For instance, M224 60 mm lightweight mortars that were no longer used by the Army were effective for the troops that were planning surprise attacks on invaders. But after the invaders went on the defensive and gradually set up fortresses, several rows of high-caliber machine guns were installed and landmines were laid on this side of the border, the irregular forces’ role was reduced. Naturally in this phase, particularly in light of the sustained supply of equipment to invading forces, Iran had to purchase some equipment on the black market in order to defend its territory and drive foreign forces out of its soil because Saddam’s supporters and provocateurs had blocked all options for Iran to legally purchase arms. Therefore, the issue of military components for Western equipment in Iran dates from the time the equation of battle in Iran had totally changed. Therefore, Bergman’s allegations are basically false. More untrue is his effort to create the impression that Israel had secretly sold equipment to Iran to give it superiority over Iraq.

Before answering this unfounded allegation which is in conflict with the Zionists’ approach to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, we highlight some instances of media propaganda which Bergman has referred to:

1. Painting a distorted image of zealous Iranian men and women who first pinned down the armed-to-the-teeth invader with the simplest defense tools before pushing it out: “Tens of thousands of boys and men, wearing scarlet headbands…streamed to the war zone. Many carried plastic “keys to heaven,” made in Taiwan.” (Chapter 3, p. 54): Zionist media were spreading this big lie in a bid to strip the Iranian nation of any dignity and respect in the world. Of course such contradictory remarks and hostile stances at that time show the Zionists’ fury over neutralization of their plans by Iranian combatants. With such propagandistic enmities against the Iranian nation, how can one believe Israel’s support of Iran in the war? Bergman has also fabricated another insolent story about demining operation by Iraqi troops: “At first, the Revolutionary Guards tried driving herds of donkeys or other animals over the mined areas to clear a path for the troops. But as soon as the first beast was blown up, the others abandoned the mission and refused to advance to their certain deaths. However, another solution was in the offing.” (Chapter 3, p. 53): Bergman goes on to attribute a fake fatwa to Imam Khomeini that 12-year-old youths can go to the fronts without their parents’ consent. Bergman is trying to insinuate into minds that young combatants were used for clearing minefields. “They cleared minefields by running across them, as human testers. They attacked and destroyed Iraqi tanks, employing kamikaze methods.” (Ibid, p. 54): Regardless of lies attributed to Imam Khomeini in Bergman’s book, it has to be said that those with minimum information about the warfronts know quite well that the landmines were protected by machineguns, thereby blocking easy entry into the fields. Therefore, demolition teams used to remove the razor wire set up around landmines on the eve of any military operation. They swept mines to the width of a passageway and placed white strip on both sides to signal to combatants that this route has been demined. The demolition teams had high knowledge of landmines and booby traps besides being extremely courageous because at any moment they were likely to be located by watchmen behind machineguns and be targeted or even fall into booby traps. We can now realize Bergman’s degree of propagandistic hostility. Does this level of enmity against Iranian combatants who pushed invading forces of Saddam out by sacrificing their life mean the Zionists were standing by the Iranian nation in the tough battle with Iraq? The volunteer forces who were sacrificing their lives in defending Iran’s national dignity and resisting bullying and aggression as well as demolition forces who smiled at death at any moment were growing significantly mentally, mystically and spiritually because they had liberated themselves from all material interests and looked for their God amid fire and blood. When you listened to them speaking in the fortifications you found them much more knowledgeable than mystics who had purified themselves for 40 years. Saddam had no idea of the spiritual power of these devotees; otherwise, he would not have been fooled by the pro-Zionist front to invade Iran. These devotees took their time in isolation and wrote letters to their relatives or penned their wills. Sometimes they developed some phrases that surprised everyone. In an attempt to overshadow this talent, Bergman repeats an allegation that Zionist-led media repeated during the eight-year war. “Each one wrote a will before going into combat, with the help of special scribes who were sent to the front for this purpose. Most of these testaments were letters addressed to the imam or to Dear Mom.” (Chapter 3, p. 54). It is clear to everyone why this big lie has been fabricated. The issue of Iran’s eight-year defense is highly attractive to researchers in various communities. Saddam was backed by the pro-Zionist Western front as well as Arab leaders who had not revealed their ties with the occupiers of Palestine and even the Eastern bloc. But he was defeated by a nation subject to arms embargo, pushing the US to intervene directly. Saddam’s defeat from a sanctions-hit nation despite so much support remains an equation with several unknowns.