Exclusive: What Unfolded Within Israeli Intelligence Systems Hours Before Al-Aqsa Operation?

This reveals the profound shortcomings and failures of the Israeli regime in the intelligence warfare with Hamas.

Based on the information obtained by correspondents from the Hebrew desk of Tasnim News Agency, in the final hours leading up to the Al-Aqsa storm operation, which began at approximately 6:30 AM on Saturday, October 7, Israel Security Agency, better known by the acronym Shabak (also known as Shin Bet), learned through their informants and espionage sources about the movements of Palestinian forces near the Gaza border wall.

Then Ronen Bar, the Director of Shabak (Shin Bet) was informed about the information at 2:00 AM, leading him to attend the headquarters for an initial briefing.

According to Tasnim sources, the initial reports were first shared with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence), and several other officers. However, when the Chief of Staff downplayed the significance of the news, Shabak took direct action.

While the assessment of the army and Shabak primarily focused on the possibility of military exercises by the Palestinian Resistance groups, Shabak decided to send a team of seven Shabak forces, known as the "Tequila Team," in two groups of three and four members.

One group was sent to Kibbutz "Nativ Ha'sra" in the north of Gaza, and the other was dispatched to Kibbutz "Beiri" in the east of Gaza.

These two groups arrived at their designated areas around 5 AM, only to be ambushed by waiting Hamas forces. All members of the Tequila Team were neutralized in the ambush.

After the initial confrontation, Shabak immediately requested reinforcement, leading to the dispatch of a team from "Yamam," a special police unit.

The Yamam assistance team arrived in the midst of the ongoing battle with Hamas in which nine of their members also were killed at the hands of Palestinian resistance fighters.

Some of the Yamam forces had driven in personal vehicles and encountered clashes with Hamas forces in the vicinity of the Sderot town.

The names of the Yamam members who were killed are as follows:

• Avshalom Yair Portz
• Moshe El Shlomo
• Alenzi Shamkelou
• Khan Nakhmias
• Bar Siwan
• Yurai Eliyahu Cohen
• Doror Alton
• Stanislaw Shikman

Following the events, the first report was provided at 6 AM to Avi Gil, the head of the Prime Minister's Military Office. He then informed Benjamin Netanyahu at 6:29 AM, and Netanyahu himself arrived at the government building in The Kirya at 7:30 AM.

Thus far, the names of 10 Shabak personnel who were killed during the Al-Aqsa Storm operation have been released. Among them, seven were members of the dispatched Tequila Team. One of the three others was at his residence and two others were killed during an attack on a music festival.

The names of the Shabak members who were killed are as follows:

• Itai Yehoshua (36 years old)
• Uomer Berga (26 years old)
• Samdar Mor Eidan (38 years old)
• Yusef Ther (39 years old)
• Maur Shalom (46 years old)
• Aili Nakhman (23 years old)
• Eidou Adri (24 years old)
• Amit Vaks (48 years old)
• Michal Ben Moshe (26 years old)
• Itai Murano (24 years old)

The vehicles and bodies of these individuals were found by Israeli military personnel at 8 AM.

This significant surprise attack and intelligence failure occurred despite recent reports from the Israeli army, indicating that Hamas had been preparing, designing, training, and coordinating for the Al-Aqsa storm operation for over a year.

According to the report, during the initial hours of the conflict, between 800 to 1000 Palestinian fighters infiltrated the occupied territories from 80 different points, entering 20 towns and 11 military bases of the Israeli army.

This intelligence and security failure, which marks one of the greatest setbacks in the history of the regime, is expected to have significant political repercussions, with many speculating about its impact on the tenure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Even opposition leader Benny Gantz, who was compelled to form a coalition with Netanyahu amidst this conflict, has stated that those responsible for the intelligence failure must be held accountable after the war.

Recently, Ronen Bar, the Director of Shin Bet, publicly accepted responsibility for the intelligence failure in the Al-Aqsa storm battle, acknowledging, "Despite the measures we took, on Saturday, we were unable to provide sufficient warning and thwart the enemy's attack." He emphasized that he will take responsiblity for this defeat, "but for now, it is a time of war, and investigations will come later."

Bar's remarks likely allude to the public and political outcry regarding the performance of Israel's government and intelligence agencies at the outset of the Al-Aqsa Storm battle.