An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 5
TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Israeli teachers of Savak were receiving big sums for training and equipment, whose result was further public hatred of the Pahlavi regime, while at the same time the Zionists were receiving exorbitant sums to erase the consequences of a dictatorship they had upgraded off minds.
Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.
Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.
Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.
In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.
In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.
His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.
Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, specially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.
Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.
About ‘The Secret War with Iran’
Part 5:
It is fully clear to any researcher that the Zionists are on the one hand acknowledging the crimes and injustices committed by the Shah and his secret police in a bid to exonerate themselves while on the other, in stark contrast with available evidence, they deny any role in the crimes attributed to the Pahlavis.
Of course this approach belongs to the period when there was a transparent image of the autocratic behavior of the Pahlavi regime, but gradually as new generations become further unfamiliar with the realities the Zionists no longer speak so clearly about Pahlavi crimes; rather they would take pride in that period. The key point is that during that period, Israeli teachers of Savak were receiving big sums for training and equipment, whose result was further public hatred against the Pahlavi regime, while at the same time the Zionists were receiving exorbitant sums to erase the consequences of a dictatorship they had upgraded off minds. Royal Court Minister Alam has expounded on this act of plunder. He puts it as follows: “On Wednesday, September 8, 1976, I was received in audience [by the Shah] and gave His Majesty of a full account of talks with the ambassador of Israel. First I stated the good parts. I said that Yankelovich (named by the Israelis) would be doing our publicity in the US. I said that he is advising Carter. I also said that Druck would be in charge of executive affairs in publicity as he is currently advising Ford. The Shah smiled and said: ‘You did what Farman Farma exactly did by naming his sons as liaison officers at foreign embassies.” (Alam’s Notes, edited by Ali-Naqi Alikhani, vol. 6, Maziar & Moin Publications, 2008, p. 239-240)
Therefore, by signing a major contract, the Zionists commit themselves to purifying the White House-backed dictator in the eyes of Western public opinion. But was it possible to easily erase the nation’s hatred vis- -vis them in the light of the inhumane training of Savak?
Alam has something important in his memoirs to that effect. The findings of polls conducted in the US and Europe were surprising to courtiers and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in person.
“I received Yankelovich, the deputy head of Israeli information and press department, for three hours. He gave me a detailed report of the image of Iran in the US and Europe. It was very interesting and very bad. We are heavy sleepers and I am happy to have notified the Shah of this issue.” (Ibid, p. 338)
But the same report that awakens Alam about the Zionists’ role in anti-Shah hatred due to assisting Savak in applying the most brutal measures infuriates Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
“On Sunday, November 28, 1976, I read out to His Majesty the report presented by [Sirous] Partovi who works with Yankelovich. He got angry and said how this negative thought has struck this guy’s mind to poll people. Who is this nosy guy you have chosen? I said we had asked a leading institute to study Iran’s image in the US and then in Europe so that we can find solutions to our problems. How could it ignore pains?” (Ibid, p. 349)
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was always escaping realities on the ground, but just like a homeless child, he sees no option but to rely on his foreign supporters as he had no link with the Iranian nation.
“Trembling with fear, I asked His Majesty to read Yankelovich’s report containing proposals for domestic administration before giving me instructions. I said His Majesty had to make a final decision. He read it carefully. But today without any fury, he said: ‘It is endorsed. Implement it.’ I wasn’t surprised as the Shah always acted thoughtfully for one thousand reasons, including publicity, infiltration into the Carter administration, into Israel and US Jewry.” (Ibid, p. 359)
But Mohammad Reza Pahlavi knows quite well of the Zionists’ greed for devouring national wealth everywhere. Their motives were doubled. On the one hand, they gained from torturing freedom-seekers, supplying equipment and sharing technical knowhow to that effect while on the other, they are paid big sums to brush up on the savage image of Savak and the Shah. He doesn’t trust them, but he had been caught in their trap. Alam has reflected this lack of trust effectively. “I was asked: Who? I said: The Yankelovich Institute can run Europe’s affairs too? I said it would have to administer Europe too later. He said never should the entire world be given fully to Jews. I said I was then mistaken, but you had ordered me as such.” (Ibid, p. 372)
In another passage, the same concern with the Zionists is reflected more frankly: “On Thursday, December 30, 1976, I presented His Majesty with the instructions designed based on Yankelovich’s proposal. His Majesty asked: ‘What do you mean by international?’ I said that it should be limited to the US. I noted that publicity in the world, particularly between the US, Britain and Europe, is totally interdependent. In practice you will see they are inseparable and our half-hearted measure will get nowhere. After deeply thinking, he said: ‘That’s true that there might be some links, but I don’t want to give authority over publicity fully to the Jews. I agreed on the US because they are really influential.” (Ibid, pp. 385-386)
The Zionists who were in charge of protecting Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s crown and throne within the framework of US and British regional policy were plundering such that even someone like the Shah was worried despite his dependence because he saw them as symbols of greed and avarice. The Pahlavi II monarch expressed his deep knowledge of the Zionists in the following sentence: “He said this guy, Mike Dallas, the CBS correspondent, interviewed me with such vindictive tone that I had to tell him the US is held hostage by Jews…I said such position did not match our publicity cooperation. He told me to explain to the Jews that I had to respond to this nasty guy in this way.” (Ibid, pp. 301-302)
He who was playing well into the Zionists’ hands and had given them many concessions now considered them to be totally unreliable. When he wants to insult someone he links him to Jewry. In other words, even someone like Mohammad Reza Pahlavi refers to infamous persons as Jew, i.e. symbol of avarice and opportunism.
Israel’s ambassador has implicitly highlighted the Shah’s mistrust of Jews in his memoirs because he acknowledges that Zionist-affiliated media no longer honored their obligations as soon as the world public opinion was captivated by the national uprising in Iran.
“In the eyes of Americans, we managed to portray the Shah of Iran as a leader wishing progress of his nation and sparing no effort to that end. On the issue of my links with the Pahlavi family I will say to what extent the Shah believed in the skills of the Israelis and the power of their mass media across the globe particularly in the US and to what extent he knew this fateful point…Oddly enough, such impression did not survive in the face of solidarity of belligerent forces who considered themselves as the Student Confederation. During the Shah’s visit to Germany and the US, the incapacity of some “obedient” media became clear to everyone…During the Autumn 1979 events, we saw that media persons who were accustomed to coquetry could not survive the storm of fury and backed down. The number of favorable and unfavorable sycophant journalists who became more voracious after every meeting with the Shah was on the rise.” (Festschrift, Meir Ezri, translated by Abraham Hakhami, printed in Beit ul-Moqaddas, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 213)
By “favorable media” Ezri meant print media owned by the Zionists. With the objective of undermining the characteristics of this group, he creates the impression that “they did not resist the furious storm and they backed down soon”. But the fact is that first, the Iranian national revolt was a calm popular uprising during which the Israeli embassy in Tehran was not stormed even once despite Israeli crimes in this territory, some of which would be noted in response to unrealistic claims by the author of The Secret War with Iran. Second, Israeli media are based in the US and Europe. How did they feel threatened by the storm of fury to abandon their obligations in return for big sums? Third, could Zionist media professionally keep printing several pages of publicity flattering the ruling dictatorship in Iran while the public opinion in the US and Europe had become strongly anti-Pahlavi in the final years of this regime? As it was noted, the Shah became furious as soon as he learned about the findings of the Yankelovich Institute’s poll. It means that by that time the nations’ stance became more conflicting with US, British and Israeli policies of supporting the ruling dictatorship in Iran. Third, the Confederation had already collapsed by that time and supporters of the Islamic Revolution were leading the student movement overseas. Student activities were limited to holding speeches and screening documentaries on Iran, staging hunger strikes in major churches, holding rallies in key cities, distributing leaflets and pamphlets and so on. Therefore, there was no violence or radicalism to have frightened Zionist-run media. It was only that the public opinion had learnt about the crimes and profiteering opportunists, as noted by Israel’s ambassador, could no longer keep flattering about the Shah whom they had nurtured.
Last but not least, it has to be noted that plunder of Iran’s national wealth was not limited to what said here. There is a lot to say about other issues like fake arms deals, cultural heritage theft, and agricultural deals that reversed Iran’s exports to Israel over several decades. We will discuss them in the following chapters on The Secret War with Iran.
This Introduction sought to briefly review an important experience in human history about the capability or incapability of the Zionists in preventing the downfall of unpopular governments. A base has emerged in the heart of West Asia after the occupation of Palestine. It has even been armed with nuclear warheads while billions of dollars has been injected into it for more than three decades. If it becomes clear that the Zionists’ insatiable greed in plundering the financial resources of regional nations led Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to downfall, a major political development will take shape. In other words, the West’s support for Israel will be destabilized while the installed rulers’ view of application of Zionist-prescribed violence will change dramatically. Historians in Israel are fabricating history and print works like The Secret War with Iran in a bid to justify their crimes which further pushed the Iranian nation to rise up on the one hand and create the impression on the other hand that post-Revolution Iran is a serious threat to Western nations and that it is the Zionists who have contained this threat.
Hopefully, this criticism on The Secret War with Iran could make researchers more acquainted with the realities of the past and Iran’s post-Revolution strategy for containing racism.
Abbas Salimi-Namin
Director, Office of Iran History Studies and Compilation