An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 12

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 12:

Relying on the Lubrani-Merhav classified report, which even the CIA refuses to confirm, The Secret War on Iran is seeking to prove that the Americans had no clear understanding of Iran’s affairs, which finally led to the downfall of the Shah. For instance, with regard to US officials’ acknowledgement of ignoring the role of religion in Iran, it writes: “Admiral Stansfield Turner, CIA director from 1977 to 1981, said in a press interview later, “We did not understand who Khomeini was and the support his movement had. We were just plain asleep.”” (Chapter 1, p. 4)

Definitely, the Americans did not care for unarmed masses and downplayed their efficacy. Rather, their focus was mainly on Marxist groups who were backed by the northern neighbor. But wasn’t the Zionists’ portrayal of a very positive image of the Shah regime’s conditions instrumental in the decision-makers’ dreaming in Washington? However, due to their anxiety with the instability of dictatorship, the Americans were trying to force Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to make certain superficial changes while the Zionists opposed the least criticism of the Shah. The last head of Mossad branch in Tehran puts it: “The US rose up and raised the issue of human rights with exaggeration. In that stage, few believed that the US warning on this issue was extremely exaggerating. But no later had the passed since the big avalanche struck the Shah regime than everyone or the majority realized that the US had extremely exaggerated in its effort to force the Shah to respect human rights and grant freedom of expression.” (Big Satan, Small Satan, Eliezer Tsafrir, translated by Farnoosh Ram, Autumn 2007, Ketab Corps., Los Angeles, p. 93)

In light of Carter’s stance vis-� -vis the massacre of defenseless people through the September 8, 1978 peaceful demonstrations, heaping praise on the Shah in a strange way during his visit to Tehran, Tsafrir’s words make clear how serious Carter was in his call for the Shah to respect human rights. Furthermore, criticism of Carter’s call for superficial referendums to mislead the public opinion means that for Mossad agents, Carter had to support the suppression of people without any criticism of the Shah. Such approach shows the degree of the Zionists’ belief in the “literature of massacre”. Further allegations about sadness with corruption in the Pahlavi II regime and predicting his imminent downfall are unfounded.

Another issue highlighted by Bergman in this chapter is the failure of a coup that had been planned nationwide by Huyser. Simultaneously with the Shah’s insistence on leaving the country due to growing public fury, the issue of coup became more serious, but that required arrangement by senior Army commanders. In a bid to feel comfortable with military commanders, Mohammad Reza never let the Armed Forces Staff have the minimum role in arrangements. Each commander was in contact with him independently, which explains why their differences were deep-seated. Therefore, without the Shah’s central role, a coup was impossible. But as it was noted, the Shah had flown over Tehran and heard millions of demonstrators shouting “Death to the Shah”. He was terrified and therefore he did not like to see any coup happen in Iran as long as he was in the country because such coup risked failure and would trigger people to demonstrate massively. For this reason, the US, Britain and even the Zionists were strongly willing to contain the nationwide revolt in Iran preferably through political deception. They thought Bakhtiar was a good option and they had relied on his influence as a core member of National Front. Therefore, the coup had to overcome several primary obstacles. Dispatching Huyser to Iran resolved only three problems: 1. filling the void left after the Shah’s departure and playing a coordinator role; 2. Training Army generals to work together based on military mechanisms; and 3. Arranging Army’s moves by envisioning an opportunity for Bakhtiar’s success.

However, there were some other obstacles including logistic arrangements for the coup and most importantly supplying fuel to tanks and other military assets against the backdrop of general strike by petroleum industry staff. Of course Washington had promised to dispatch an oil tanker carrying gasoline to the Persian Gulf, whose unloading was not easy though.

Meantime, the issue of direct US intervention to give assurances to Iranian Army generals against possible actions by northern neighbors in case of a military coup in Iran should be reflected on although some warships had been deployed to the Persian Gulf. The other issue was that despite the August 1953 coup, this time Washington was seeking to attribute any future coup entirely to the Shah’s Army generals. In other words, he was skeptical about deploying his military to confront a nationwide revolt in case signs emerge of the failure of the coup, in which case it would mean accepting the consequences of a war of attrition in which 90% of Iran’s Army would join people against the US. Despite these ambiguities, the White House never ruled out coup as an option. Bergman’s allegations in this book run counter to all realities on the ground and historical documents. General Alexander Haig, who was serving as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, writes in the Introduction to General Huyser’s memoirs: “In early January 1979, while Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I was called by an official of the Office of the Secretary of Defence about the deteriorating situation in Iran. The President wished to send General Robert E. 'Dutch' Huyser, my deputy as Commander of US forces in Europe, to Tehran. His mission was murky. Subsequent conversations with officials in the White House suggested that his purpose was to make a military coup.” (Mission to Tehran, Robert E. Huyser)

Huyser recounts his meeting with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi just days before his departure.

“The Shah now reverted to the plans the military were working on. He said he wasn't clear as to who would execute them. I explained that the hope was to put them into operation under the leadership of Prime Minister Bakhtiar, but they would be written in such a way that the military could act unilaterally if necessary. This served two purposes. First, though his generals had talked about a military takeover, they had no idea how they were going to do it. Second, the planning might heal the distrust between Mr Bakhtiar and the generals… When I was working on his concept and doctrine, he had been extremely sensitive to the possibility of a military takeover…He went into a lengthy 'what-if analysis of the present outlook. The principal speculations were: what if Khomeini would not back away? And what if Bakhtiar failed?” (Ibid, p. 93)

It is clear that the Shah was not ready to assume any responsibility over a coup because he was a man of parties not a man of combats. During the 1953 coup when the national movement was more limited, he did not accept any responsibility. Now, new documents reveal that the Shah had not dismissed Dr. Mossadeq, rather it was Wilber (a top CIA agent) who had faked the Shah’s signature. The coup is plotted such that the American would not be directly involved. Therefore, the coup had to build over Bakhtiar; otherwise, Army commanders had to assume full responsibility. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi uses buts and ifs in a bid to hear from the four-star US general that Washington would wholeheartedly back a military coup, but he receives no encouraging response.

What caused the Americans to act very prudently was the possibility of being dragged into a military and political quagmire. Even the Zionists who are expert in assassination declined Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s proposal to assassinate the Imam. But after the Shah left the country they repeatedly asked Army generals to take action. They even ask General Rabiei to down the plane carrying Imam Khomeini back to Tehran.

But Huyser and Mossad representatives in Tehran wondered how the Shah’s Army generals who had no decision-making power could now decide about setting fire to Iran and the entire region and accept its responsibility.

Huyser puts it as follows: “When I told the Secretary how I had had to get tough with the Group that day, he commented rather forcefully that my job was only to advise. The decisions were to be made by the Iranians. It was clear that Washington felt very strongly about this. I could understand the administration's sensitivity, with Pravda branding me as a Military Governor, and a Vice-Regent replacing the Shah, but in my heart I did not agree. I wanted action. Of course it was true that Washington would get the blame if anything went wrong, which could happen at any moment. Yet throughout this whole period I had always tried to stick to my advisory role. The problem was that the Group had been told by the Shah: 'Listen to him, trust him, and obey him, he is your general.'” (Ibid, p. 248)  

But could this four-star general whom Mohammad Reza called on everyone to obey could convince commanders who have only learnt to say “Yes Sir!” to change within a month? Huyser gives his account of a top general as follows: “General Gharabaghi got rather emotional over the previous day's affair at the Gendarmerie headquarters. Having a general officer treated in that way must have brought home what could happen to any of them. He blustered, and tried to blame me for having ordered the troops to lower their guns and fire into the crowd. In fact, he shook his finger at me and said: 'You're to blame. The blood's on your hands.' This was more than I was ready to take, considering that he had personally given the orders, and it brought back my fears about how he might react in a real crisis. He became very excitable, and once again I had to raise my voice and get tough. My final question to him was, did the tactic achieve the objective? As always, this gave me an odd sensation: I felt like I was scolding children.” (Ibid, p. 245)