An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 11

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 11:

Chapter 2

In Chapter 2, Bergman brings up two allegations in a bid to attribute the downfall of the Shah solely to Washington’s wrong policies and lack of foresight: 1. The US ending its support for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; 2. Carter’s special envoy Huyser disrupting a coup plot.

Regarding the first allegation, Bergman writes: “On January 16, the Shah—ailing and debilitated—decided that without American backing, he had best pack up and leave.” (Chapter 2, p. 32)

In response, it should be noted that most Court loyalists and the US disagreed with the Shah leaving the country. Second, it was Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, flying over Tehran, who directly heard millions chanting “Death to the Shah” on Ashura Day in 1978. That struck such deep fear into his heart that he made up his mind about leaving. Second, the Americans never pulled the rug out from under the Shah’s feet. Even after the Black Friday savage massacre, Carter contacted the Shah on the phone, saying he would support his actions for establishing order in Iran.

Therefore, whatever the Zionists describe as the US turning its back to the Shah to justify their own incapacity in saving the coup-born dictatorship mainly pertains to the difference between two views: Based on one view, in order to preserve the Pahlavi monarchy, the Shah was required to make some changes, albeit superficial, and stop the daily-growing dictatorship which was pushing the society towards explosion. Expressed mainly by Washington, this view insisted on the argument that the society could not be managed only by applying suppression; rather, the dictatorial regime had to tolerate other supporters of the West in order to prevent any unity between all classes. But the Zionist-backed view called for increased pressure. The Zionists believed that Iran could be managed and the opponents of Western dominance could be removed by using iron fist and killing millions.

Today, many Western sociologists say the first view would be more practical, noting that the measures taken for leading the dictatorial regime out of crisis were belated as Iranian society was on the brink of explosion. Therefore, Washington lost its control over affairs and everything fell into the hands of the leadership of movement fighting dictatorship and foreign dominance. US measures and reforms in the run-up to the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime were passive. Without Zionist-led misleading propaganda in favor of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Washington might have sooner reached a correct perception of what was under way in the hidden layers of Iranian society and have been able to undertake reforms to save the monarchy. In this case too, Bergman has plunged again into contradiction. On the one hand, he calls into question Carter and his approach for changes, albeit apparent, and lays the blame on him for the downfall of the Shah, while on the other hand, he is critical of the Pahlavi regime.

For instance, in Chapter 1, he emerges as a tough critic of destructive corruption within the monarchy, saying the Shah has to be forced to change strategy. The meeting between the Israeli ambassador to Tehran (Lubrani), last but one head of Mossad in Tehran (Merhav) and the Shah in Kish is described as follows: “On the way back, the two Israelis discussed what they had seen and heard, and agreed that the regime was teetering, that something very bad was about to happen. …Soon after their visit, the two men transmitted a grave warning to the Israeli security establishment: the rule of the Shah was crumbling. The unlikely coalition established between secular and religious opponents of his regime, along with the flagrant corruption and the monarch’s detachment from reality, were leading to the imminent demise of the Pahlavi dynasty.” (Chapter 1, p. 20)

Bergman claims that the pair’s report was not accepted by a group comprising Mossad and Israeli foreign ministry representatives (in their eyes, Iran is strong and the Shah regime will still survive for years thanks to the Army guns and Savak’s interrogation dungeons), but he scoffs at the CIA’s exaggerated description of Lubrani-Merhav report and accuses the CIA of being blind. “The report was forwarded to Washington, where the CIA’s experts on Iran and their State Department counterparts discounted it. …The CIA had thousands of informants in Iran at that time, far more than Lubrani and Merhav had, but the agency was nonetheless completely blind to what was happening in the country.” (Chapter 1, p. 22)

However, the author ignores the fact that the Zionists were blinder than everyone else due to the possibility of plundering Iran’s national wealth because with the election of Carter, the US is at least using some of its bargaining chips to pressure Mohammad Reza into accepting reforms, but the Zionists were doing exactly the contrary. Had they really seen the Shah on the verge of collapse due to daily-growing corruption and dictatorship, they would have, like the US, dragoon him into carrying out reforms, albeit on a small scale. But the Zionists behaved so as to defeat Washington’s restrictions aimed at forcing the Shah to accept small-scale reforms.

“Reuven Merhav, head of the Mossad station in Iran at the time, explains that the Shah wanted to work with Israel more than ever after the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976. “Carter began asking questions about human rights, including everything that was going on in Iran,” recalls Merhav. “The Iranians were scared that the gates would close in America and Western Europe, and were looking for alternative sources of supply” for their weapons needs.’” (Chapter 1, p. 5)

Therefore, the Zionists did not worry about the growing corruption within Mohammad Reza’s Court and the instability of his dictatorship. Nor did they think of any remedy, and they were even neutralizing US and European remedial acts.

As explained in Chapter 1, the Zionists were increasingly equipping Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with tools of suppression on the strength of their imagination of having shattered the Palestinian nation’s willpower by applying iron fist. In their imagination, the only problem was the world public opinion, which they had arranged by using their maximum clout with information networks. In his memoirs (late 1950s and early 1960s), the Israeli ambassador openly and proudly speaks about efforts to mislead nations. “Gradually, we print more and more in international media. Kia (director of Army’s Organ II) has asked me to translate different newspaper clips to share with the Shah every morning at Saadabad Palace…One day the Shah had quipped: ‘You’ll see that one day our ambassadors all across the globe will attribute all Israeli achievements in newspapers to themselves and take pride in them, little knowing that we already know all these stories.’…I wrote to Joseph Frankel, member of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), suggesting that he write in Jewish media across the globe in support of Iran and the Shah to take a constructive step…Frankel replied, saying he had asked on Jewish media across the globe to write in favor of Iran.” (Festschrift, Meir Ezri, translated by Abraham Hakhami, printed in Beit ul-Moqaddas, 2000, vol. 1, p. 211)

This initiative became more organized in the 1970s due to growing revelations by student organizations across the world. The idea was to paint a good picture of the Shah within the framework of a deal with the Zionists, built over Amir Assadollah Alam, the minister of royal court. Lubrani, then ambassador of Israel, showed no opposition. Rather, he fully backed this propaganda network due to its high profitability for the Zionists across the globe. When we take a closer look at Bergman’s description of the ambassador’s negative intra-organizational report, we can find the reason. Mossad had adopted a plan to boost Lebanon’s widely hated Falangists whom even Christians disavowed. He wanted Mohammad Reza to finance the initiative, but the Shah refused because of the negative consequences of direct aid to this infamous group that was serving as the executive arm of the Zionists in Lebanon.

“The Mossad and the Foreign Ministry feared that the Shi’ites in Lebanon were increasingly becoming captives of extremist Islamist ideology. A young and fanatical preacher by the name of Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who would later become the spiritual compass for Hezbollah, was already reaping great success among them. The Israelis believed that massive aid to this population, along the lines of the assistance Israel was already giving the Christians in Lebanon by rebuilding the wrecked infrastructure in the south—assistance in the export of commodities and in other economic matters—could prevent that process of radicalization. Lubrani and Merhav, with the blessing of the CIA station in Tehran, had come to Kish to try to persuade the Shah to finance the project.” (Chapter 1, p. 19)

Raising doubt with the financing of the Zionists’ scheme for Lebanon, built over Christin Falangists, led to the production a confidential negative report against Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Israel’s ambassador even ignores this fact. Faced with an internal uprising, the Shah would face tougher conditions because as it was said Falangists were mercenaries, hated by Christians as well as Muslims, either Shia or Sunni. Therefore, there was no reason for helping Falangists at the expense of the Muslim Iranian nation calling into question his legitimacy. In a bid to punish Mohammad Reza, Mossad compiled an intra-organizational report and shared it even with the CIA. Therefore, a fully classified initiative brought a foreign-backed ruler to his senses. Of course after the Shah downfall, Israel implemented this plan and occupied Lebanon to let Falangists rule in the south. However, shortly after, in the face of public fury, it had to pull out shamefully. Falangists, who had committed many crimes in the shadow of Israeli military, had no place to stay and they were erased off Lebanon’s political scene for good.