An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 13

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 13:

Therefore, the highest-ranking Army commanders, despite their glorious appearance, were like children who had never had the chance to grow up due to the ruling dictatorship. Bergman has highlighted this point in Chapter 1. “One day in August 1978, Iranian air force commander General Amir Hossein Rabiei summoned Segev to a secret meeting in Tehran. “I want to ask something personal of you,” Rabiei said, as Segev recalls. “‘Bring General (Moshe) Dayan here. The Shah admires him very much. Somebody has to tell him what’s going on in the streets.’ I told him, ‘But General, it is you who always tells me that every time you wait for an audience with the Shah, you sit in the first chair of twelve, because he respects you so much. Why don’t you tell him?’ Rabiei looked at me in surprise and with a little contempt. ‘That’s correct, but he sits on an elevated throne and looks down on us and all we can say is, “Yes, sir, yes, sir.”.” (Chapter 1, p. 23)

Were the Americans and the Zionists unaware of the ominous impacts of the black Pahlavi dictatorship on the growth of Iranian talents? The answer is affirmative without any doubt because they saw such a model as effective for maximum pillage of Iran. Domineering forces did not want to be faced with multiple decision-makers; rather they were willing to settle their disputes with one in this land. It was not the opponents and critics of US hegemony who were being suppressed violently; rather someone like Abolhassan Ebtehaj, who had very friendly ties with Mohammad Reza and Washington and was brought into Iran by the Americans following the August 1953 coup to head the Planning and Budgeting Organization, fell from grace only because of expressing his expert views in private meetings, which did not suit the taste of Pahlavi and foreigners ruling Iran.

Ebtehaj believed that cutting from the budget allocation to development projects every year and instead adding to the share of arms purchase would trigger an explosion in Iranian society. Ebtehaj repeated this warning and he was imprisoned temporarily. Amini, Entezam and their likes were also marginalized by Mohammad Reza’s dictatorship so that a single person would implement their (foreigners’) desired policy. In the late 1950s, upon White House insistence, Ali Amini was named prime minister. The Shah travelled to the US and asked US officials why they preferred Amini while he could meet their demands more effectively. For his commitment, Ali Amini went into isolation until the Pahlavi downfall. Therefore, the putschists’ excessive demands halted the intellectual and characteristic growth of other courtiers and affiliates of foreign governments.

Knowing this, why should the White House and Zionists make efforts to count on military commanders whom they did not see as key figures for plotting a coup after the Shah had fled Iran? The US, Britain and even the Zionists refused to be central to the coup because they were assured that in light of the widespread revolt across Iran, such an action would not remain limited to arrests, bombings or even massacre of people; rather, that would disintegrate Iranian society and subsequently the Army with opponents of dictatorship and foreign dominance forming the majority in the new alignment. Therefore, foreign supporters of a coup were forced to be directly involved in a campaign whose future remained obscure. The key point with that coup was that the US, Britain and the Zionists had already conducted such antinational action, but this time they feared the consequences of another coup. They expected that the Shah’s military commanders, seen as children, would not fear after the Shah’s departure and assume such big risk. Therefore, the performance of the Americans and the Zionists matched when it comes to plotting a coup. Neither side wants to assume responsibility for the coup. Furthermore, the maximum role they accept would be advisory. The last head of Mossad’s station in Tehran puts it: “I asked military attaché Itzik Segev: ‘Is there any more red line to overstep before feeling the final threat?’ He replied: ‘Doubtlessly, we are faced with tough conditions, but everything depends on the senior commanders’ decisions. If they seriously act as they have pledged they can still overcome this situation.’ Let’s wait and see.” (Big Satan, Small Satan, Eliezer Tsafrir, translated by Farnoosh Ram, Autumn 2007, Ketab Corps., Los Angeles, p. 247)

Huyser and the Zionists had both received promises from senior commanders of the Shah for a coup, how different was their approach then? Even regarding the assassination of Imam Khomeini, the Zionists’ response to the Shah shows they fear the consequences of such decision. These most skilled terrorists in human history, whom Bergman cites some of them in Rise and Kill First; The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, give a risible response to Mohammad Reza. Following such response, did they expect him to remain calm and not think of fleeing Iran? Tsafrir’s account: “In those days I received a message that on behalf of the Shah, the Royal Court Minister would ask us, the Israelis, to take ‘necessary action’ against Khomeini. To understand the concept of this message and that ‘necessary action’ which the Shah wanted about Khomeini, you don’t need to be very smart to understand it as anybody can easily guess what ‘action’ would make the Shah happy…No later had several days passed than my friend, Mr. D. (from Mossad HQ in Israel) came to Tehran and went straight into a meeting with the Royal Court Minister. In addition to delivering an encouraging message for the Shah to cling to the power and keep resisting, he told the Court Minister that the ‘action’ envisioned by the Shah would have no place in our culture and Mossad will not do so.” (Big Satan, Small Satan, Eliezer Tsafrir, translated by Farnoosh Ram, Autumn 2007, Ketab Corps., Los Angeles, p. 203)

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (who along with his secret police was assured of the Zionists’ expertise in assassination and death) renewed his request to Mossad’s representative in Tehran. “Later that night, one of our friends talked to us and shared with us whatever he had directly heard from the Shah and Bakhtiar. Their words were about the threat they felt over possible return of Khomeini to Iran…This friend was also wondering how the Khomeini obstacle could be overcome. Later, a friend whom I prefer to not name, came to me, asking me to meet with the Shah and Bakhtiar to insist on my request on the “necessity of doing something with Khomeini”! I acknowledge that meeting with the Shah and Bakhtiar could be seductive, but responsibility necessitated that we decline it.” (Ibid, p. 271)

Was Mohammad Reza really in error regarding Mossad’s capacity in assassination and killing and this dreaded organization that had “nurtured Savak agents” had no place for such deeds in its ideology or was it that either of supporters of the Pahlavi regime was seeking to apportion the blame for a horrible crime to another one in dealing with the nationwide revolt in Iran, which is seen as a rare event and exceptional in Tsafir’s words? The Zionists liked the Americans to claim responsibility for another coup, as was the case with the 1953 coup while Washington would like to see Mohammad Reza and his senior military commanders who had enjoyed under his support pay for the suppression of the national revolt, and Pahlavi II expected the Zionists, who had made astronomical gains during his rule, to jump to the fray and at least claim responsibility for some “necessary measures”. But all of them saw a massacre of Iranians in contrast with its long-term interests. Mohammad Reza was still dreaming of ruling Iran and hoped that his supporters would bring him back to power after fleeing unscathed. Claiming responsibility for the massacre of millions, which would have been triggered by a possible assassination of Imam Khomeini, would hsve shattered all their wishes. The Zionists were detested due to the occupation of Palestine, and Muslim masses in the region saw them as usurpers who had been imposed by force of weapons. They knew pretty well that the mass death of millions of Muslims who have grown highly popular in the Muslim world would eradicate Zionism.

For their part, the Americans were not willing to get themselves involved in a crisis far more dangerous than the war with Viet Cong. That is why Washington dispatched its second highest military officer in the NATO treaty to Iran to remove any obstacles in the way of a coup. By escaping risks, the Zionists were trying fruitlessly to strengthen Savak and prevent its undermining following the deceitful plan by the Shah to disband it. This approach imposed no cost on them; rather, it would earn them benefits. Interestingly, in addition to income from holding training courses in the midst of the popular revolt and selling equipment, they were selling information they had achieved freely from Savak to the Americans. Therefore, the Zionists whose thirst for pillaging wealth of nations is never quenched are unlikely to be able to change the course of history in their own favor by producing such works as Bergman’s.