An Argument against Ronen Bergman’s 'The Secret War with Iran' – 15


TEHRAN (Tasnim) – At the start of the occupation of Palestine, the Zionists used to supply their foods needs from Iran. But during the Pahlavi II rule, the trend was reversed because Iran’s agriculture had to be destroyed so that a movement similar to oil nationalization could no longer take shape.

Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, especially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

About ‘The Secret War with Iran’

Part 15:

The regional head of Mossad in Tehran, who was directly involved in the transfer of animals from Iran to occupied Palestine, never brings up such allegations against the Iranian nation, but Bergman, who is repeating something several decades later quoting others, must have some answers if other aspects of the realities emerge. Therefore, it is highly likely that these rare animals would have been stolen by the Zionists who continue to repeat unfair allegations against Iran in a bid to cover up their own opportunism. Plundering of Iran’s valuable assets is not limited to animals, and discovering all its aspects would require extensive and independent investigation (particularly because on the eve of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979, the Zionists were trying to destroy all documents bearing proof to their activities at various ministries of Iran). However, sporadic narratives recounted by those connected with the Zionists shed light on the tragic and painful realities.

Another case in point is the fate of Iran’s best quality date, which Israel’s ambassador writes about: “It has to be said that Israel’s high-quality date is of Iranian origin. Ben Zion Israeli, during his first travel to Iran and the Persian Gulf littoral states in 1953, had brought back an Iranian date sapling to Kibbutz Kinneret and planted it there. It was later planted in the West Bank plains and raised. After Ben Zion, Yani Oidoub from the Nahalal moshav travelled to Iran. Native Jews told them how to find Mazafti date in Bam and Kerman to be grown in Israel. In May 1955, 30,000 date saplings taken from Iranian and Iraqi palm trees were loaded in Khorramshahr to be planted in Israel after crossing the Suez watercourse.” (Festschrift, Meir Ezri, translated by Abraham Hakhami, printed in Beit ul-Moqaddas, 2000, vol. 1, p. 120)

The key point here is the Zionists’ totalitarianism. At the start of the occupation of Palestine, the Zionists used to supply their foods needs from Iran. But during the Pahlavi II rule, the trend was reversed because Iran’s agriculture and animal breeding had to be destroyed so that the country would become dependent on a single product and a movement similar to oil nationalization could no longer take shape. Israel’s role in the destruction of this advantage, which had hired 70% of Iran’s population, was double: 1. Changing the relationship between production and agrarian reforms, which will be independently discussed; 2. Depriving Iran of agriculture and animal breeding advantages to make this domain uneconomical.

Today, palm trees with high-quality dates are no longer found in Iran as they are now limited to the Occupied Territories. Genetic modifications have rendered native Iranian date seeds infertile so that they could not be brought back to Iran and be replanted. The same was done with the profitable Ahvazi cattle race which was taken out of Iran and therefore it no longer exists in the country. Such acts of plundering have been committed on a large scale, whose description would take time. But briefly it may be said that under the Pahlavis, every effort was undertaken to transform the advantages of Iranian land to Israeli advantages. Even the ancient history of Persia has not been immune to this Israeli attempt. We will discuss it independently.

In Chapter 2, like Chapter 1, Bergman does not miss any chance to discredit the flag-bearer of expulsion of the Zionists from this land. He has even resorted to fake quotes attributed to Imam Khomeini. To simplify his task, he never mentions references in order to kill the possibility of any investigation about allegations and whatever has been attributed to the Imam and other persons. Fortunately, everything about the founder of the Islamic Revolution is available in the form of chronology and it is then easy to verify any quote attributed to him.

The Zionists were instrumental in causing division in Iranian society in order to prevent the Iranian nation from closing ranks and creating a national power to struggle for independence under the Pahlavi regime. To that end, they have spared no effort to divide Iranian people. One of their fabrications pertains to the Imam’s refusal to go to the University of Tehran upon arrival in Iran.

Bergman, who has no perception of the millions of Iranians who welcomed the Leader of the Revolution and accompanied him from Mehrabad Airport to Behesht-e Zahra, has sought to magnify on this division between university and the clergy. “Khomeini turned down a proposed series of visits to the universities that had been hotbeds of the revolution so as not to share the glory with the partners in his triumph, and headed instead for the Tehran cemetery, where he made a fiery speech.” (Chapter 2, p. 34)

But it was clear from the very beginning and noted in the welcoming committee schedule that the Imam’s first destination would be Behesht-e Zahra cemetery to pay respect to the martyrs of national revolt, who sacrificed their lives for the sake of freedom from dominance and dictatorship. Committee members, who were from various groups including Freedom Movement of Iran, have never referred in their memoirs to any offer to the Imam to deliver his speech at the Sharif University of Technology or University of Tehran because on that day, leading such a big crowd stretching from Mehrabad Airport to Behesht-e Zahra into a closed area was impossible. Committee members, who were from various groups including Freedom Movement of Iran, have never referred in their memoirs to any offer to the Imam to deliver his speech at the Sharif University of Technology or University of Tehran because on that day, leading such a big crowd stretching from Mehrabad Airport to Behesht-e Zahra into a closed area was impossible.

So, there had never been a plan for (Imam’s) presence at the university for it to be opposed. Because everyone knew that guiding even a small part of the thrilled crowd to the university would not only make it impossible to leave the university could cause a catastrophic stampede. Now how and based on what evidence does Mr. Bergman claims that Imam had been scheduled to visit different universities on his path?! The account by the last regional head of Mossad in Tehran about this, which itself lacks acceptable structure, invalidates all of Mr. Bergman’s findings: “Today (February 1) Ayatollah Seyed Ruhollah al-Mousavi al-Khomeini returned to Tehran… Millions of people in each and every spot in Tehran were waiting to see the Leader of the Revolution. Their eyes were teary with joy and their hearts were beating fast. People were everywhere. Wherever you looked at, hundreds and thousands were standing close to each other. We could estimate the number of anti-Shah demonstrators, but estimating the number on that day was out of the question. Media said four million, but they are likely to have been more… Some people were trying to convince Khomeini to enter the university campus for moments…but Khomeini did not care at all and asked his chauffeur to go on…Khomeini was spitting on their face, but they did interpret at as divine benediction. When they saw that the car carrying him was moving towards Shah Reza St. they got out of the university and started running after him to at least breathe in the smoke coming of the exhaust pipe. Nobody objected. These free thinkers were running after Khomeini’s car…” (Big Satan, Small Satan, Eliezer Tsafrir, translated by Farnoosh Ram, Autumn 2007, Ketab Corps., Los Angeles, p. 309-311)

Although the account given by the regional head of Mossad in Tehran is as hostile as Bergman’s, he says the estimate of four-million people welcoming the Leader of the Revolution might be incorrect as he had witnessed the scene. He also highlights the issue of university in a way that a group was waiting in front of the university, requesting the Imam to go into the campus, but the fact is that some academics were among Welcoming Committee members and therefore the Committee’s statement could not have been ignored. Even those who were not born at that time and have reviewed pictures of that historical day know quite well that in the middle of the big crowd, it was impossible to communicate with the car carrying the Imam to invite him to the university – even if such a stopover could have been made without any pre-planning in front of the University of Tehran. It has to be kept in mind that the car carrying the Imam was virtually stuck in the middle of the big crowd. It was with special measures taken there that the Imam could arrive at Behesht-e Zahra.

In this chapter, Bergman has also raised some historical errors that indicate his misinformation about the history of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: The date of Yasser Arafat’s visit to Iran and other events is not correct; Gharabaghi had no agreement with the Imam and went into hiding on the day of the victory of the Revolution before fleeing the country; Hani al-Hassan, Palestine’s first ambassador to Iran after the Revolution, was not the Imam’s chief bodyguard; figures given about Mujahideen Khalq Organization deaths following their armed riot in 1981 are far from reality and Bergman is implicitly supporting the terrorist organization; allegations of some documents left at the Israeli embassy in Tehran are totally untrue; Bergman, trying to paint an anti-Zionist image of Saddam Hussein, quotes al-Hassan as explaining that among the documents that had been neither removed nor burned at the embassy was a list of the names of all the Mossad agents in Iraq and that Arafat ordered that the document be delivered immediately to Saddam Hussein; stories about Geffen are also aimed at showing Jews had been wronged, but any researcher can understand the propagandistic nature of such allegations.